We analyse land transaction and residential development data from Beijing, China and identify that developers' evaluation of land transaction exhibits reference dependence and loss aversion. Developers with prior land transaction losses set higher house prices than those without prior losses. This effect is strongest at the beginning and towards the end of the property sales period. It is moderated by developers' ownership structure and listing status. Privately-owned firms experience stronger effects than their state-owned counterparts, whereas unlisted firms are more strongly affected than their listed counterparts. Results have implications on the relationship between the land and the housing markets in China. In a booming land market where land acquisition entails a high price, developers will transfer excess land price to house prices, thereby increasing the latter. The land market plays an integral role in managing housing prices in China.
Introduction
Hedonic price models are routinely used to price residential properties. In such models, the pricing decision is assumed rational, and they only consider attributes that add value to properties. However, extant literature identified numerous behavioural factors influencing house prices, such as anchoring [1; 2] , inattention [3; 4] and loss aversion [1; 5; 6] . Although these studies vary greatly in terms of geographic regions and behavioural factors, they have reached two consensuses: the inclusion of behavioural factors significantly enhances the performance of hedonic price models, and prospect theory is the most widely used and applicable behavioural model in this stream of research (see, for instance [6; 7; 8] ). In this paper, we push the boundary of behavioural research in real estate studies along these directions.
We focus on the behavioural factors of reference dependence and loss aversion, two welldocumented concepts from prospect theory [9; 10] . Reference dependence refers to people's tendency of deriving utility from a comparison with a reference point; loss aversion refers to people's tendency of stronger reaction to losses than to equal-sized gains 1 . In the real estate market, the two concepts are helpful in explaining real estate market cycles [1; 5; 6; 14; 15] , household mobility decisions [8] and mortgage lender and borrower's behaviour [16; 17] , amongst others. However, most of the existing studies investigate individual or household decisions. Little is known if other market participants, such as real estate developers, are prone to such biases.
A typical residential property development project starts with real estate developers buying a plot of land and ends with them selling the properties developed on the plot. If developers price the properties rationally, then they would consider only the market value of the attributes in hedonic price model at the time of sales. Hence, land acquisition cost is irrelevant sunk cost.
However, evidence from behaviour economics corroborates that people are likely to evaluate consecutive events together if they experience prior losses in the first event, in the hope of breakeven [18; 19] . If real estate developers are also affected by loss aversion due to previous land acquisition losses, then they are likely to pursue breakeven by setting the asking prices of their housing units above the fair market prices. The study of such behaviours are of economic and policy importance. Firstly, a developer should not pursue project-specific breakeven, but rather he must push for firm-level breakeven. Thus, the sunk cost of a specific project, i.e. losses due to excessive payment for a plot of land, should be written off and ideally offset by profits from other projects. This behaviour is closely related to myopic loss aversion and narrow framing in the behavioural literature, and the adverse impacts of such behaviours are well documented [20; 21] . Secondly-and more importantly-loss aversion leads to disposition effect and, subsequently, long time-on-market and potentially high final transaction prices [22; 23; 24; 25] . In the real estate development context, any pricing mistake (e.g.
overpaying for a plot of land) is not corrected fully and timely in the subsequent sales of complete housing units. Therefore, policymakers should be wary of any loss aversion effect resulting from the land acquisition stage. Housing price regulations would most probably be effective if policies target the source of the issues, such as the overpricing of land.
We choose Beijing, China as our study area because it offers an ideal setting to test our hypotheses. The state owns all urban lands in China. Real estate developers can only obtain the right to use residential lands through public auctions of land leases from local governments.
This institutional setting offers two benefits to our analysis. Firstly, land prices are transparent and recorded accurately through the public auction platforms. Secondly, land prices can be separated clearly from house prices. These features facilitate the reliable identification of loss aversion effect due to land transaction losses.
We analyse land and house transaction records from 2003 to 2014 and find that real estate developers' pricing decisions for newly built properties exhibit reference dependence and loss aversion. When they pay prices higher than the reference land prices, they tend to set 14%
higher house prices than developers without such losses. Loss from land acquisition transactions strongly affects developers' pricing behaviour in the first year of the sales period 2 .
However, developers become rational as sales progresses into the second and the third year and when additional market information is taken in. The loss aversion effect is lowest at the third year of sales period, which is the average time to sell out housing units within a project in our sample. Our findings also confirm previous conclusions on disposition effect. We contend that the most loss-averse developers took the longest time to sell out their properties, i.e. eight years in our sample. These findings not only add to the fast-growing behavioural literature in real estate research but also highlight the important role of land market in China's housing market.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. A description of the theoretical framework is presented in Section 2, whereas the background information about real estate development in
China is provided in Section 3. The details of our empirical implementations are described in Section 4, followed by the presentation of empirical results and several robustness checks in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Conclusions and proposals for future research directions are provided in Section 7.
Theoretical Framework
We develop our empirical models based on prospect theory [9] , which has been applied in a wide range of fields such as finance [20; 23] , marketing [26; 27; 28; 29] and real estate economics [1; 5; 6; 8; 30] , amongst others 3 . The introduction of reference dependence and loss aversion is the most significant improvement that prospect theory offers to the standard economic literature. Reference dependence means that decision makers asses the value of a bundle of goods or services relative to a reference point rather than their absolute values. Loss aversion is the tendency of disliking losses more than favouring equal-sized gains. In the current study, we focus on these two elements, as illustrated in the following formula:
where " is the bundle of goods/services consumed; %&' is the reference point; ∝ and / take positive values between 0 and 1; and , is the coefficient that measures the degree of loss aversion.
In the context of real estate development, prospect theory predicts that the reference points of real estate developers will affect their pricing decision. Moreover, their behaviours will be affected by loss aversion. Developers evaluate the outcome of land auctions by comparing transaction prices with reference prices (e.g. their expectation). This comparison will put the developer in either a gain domain if the transaction price is greater than the expectation, or a loss domain if the transaction price is less than the expectation. Prospect theory then predicts that developers' behaviours are different in the two domains. Decision-makers tend to be risk seekers in the loss domain and risk aversive in the gain domain.
The concept of reference dependence is also related to a long-standing idea in the psychology literature. This idea states that prior outcomes will affect people's decision-making afterwards.
In principle, prior costs are sunk costs that are not recoverable. Therefore, future decisionmaking should not involve them. However, empirical evidence shows that decision-makers are influenced by sunk costs [32; 33] . Behavioural economists further expand the idea of sunk costs to sunk losses and gains (for simplicity, we term both as prior outcomes hereafter). They also use prospect theory to explore the effect of prior outcomes. In the well-known study of
Thaler and Johnson [19] , lab experiment evidence is obtained to show that people increase their risk-seeking behaviour after a prior gain (house money effect) and tend to pursue breakeven after prior loss. Thaler and Johnson explained the results with quasi-hedonic editing rules. They argued that peole tend to segregate the prior gain from subsequent gains but integrate the gain with subsequent losses (cancel-out). By contrast, they tend to integrate prior loss with subsequent gains (cancel-out) but segregate it from subsequent losses. People follow these rules to reduce pain from the loss. Inspired by this paper, Barberis et al. [34] defined loss aversion behaviour with the influence of prior outcomes. According to them, people are less loss averse after prior gain because the gain provides cushion for subsequent losses. Moreover, they experience increased loss averse after a prior loss because the loss heightens their sensitivity to subsequent losses. 
where 0 12 is the house price for properties on land lot i; 6 1 = (" = , " > , … )′ is a matrix of observable property attributes; 8 2 represents the time fixed effect; and 3 4 is a constant; 9:;; 1 is the truncated differences between land transaction prices and developer's reference points, as defined in Equation (3). A typical hedonic price model includes the first three components. The underlying assumption is that developers consider only the 'house account' when pricing housing units. When developers integrate 'house account' and 'land account', the gain/loss measure also enters the hedonic price model, as given in Equation (4). According to prospect theory and mental accounting, the losses and gains from land transactions affect real estate developers' behaviours differently. If developers are in the gain domain (i.e. land acquisition costs are below their expectations), then they will behave rationally when determining the asking price of housing units completed on that plot. However, if land price is above their reference point, then they will suffer from loss aversion. They will also subsequently set high asking prices for new homes built on the land lot in the hope of breaking even. In sum, standard economic theory predicts that ' 9:;; 1 = 0, whereas prospect theory predicts that ' 9:;; 1 > 0. We use data from China to test these hypotheses in the succeeding parts of the study.
Real Estate Development in China
Before the 1990s, employers provided free housing for urban residents in China. In the past decade, the real estate sector has been expanding rapidly as a result of China's economy growth and urbanisation. Outcomes from land transactions can substantially influence real estate developers' decisions in the later stages of the real estate development process.
(Insert Figure 1 Here)
Empirical Implementations

Data
We collect data from Beijing, the capital of China. Beijing has experienced a rapid population For each land lot, we calculate the distance to the city center, the nearest underground station, the nearest park, the nearest hospital and the nearest primary school with the location information. We also obtain real estate developers' ownership structure and listing status information from https://www.qichacha.com.
The dataset covers 11 out of 16 administrative districts in Beijing 9 . Figure 8 More specifically, we exclude records that have missing values and outliers (land prices or house prices three standard deviations away from the average price in the same development projects). We also exclude records that have house sales date earlier than land leasing dates. 9 Five districts, i.e. Mentougou, Yanqing, Huairou, Miyun, and Pinggu, are omitted due to data availability. 10 Chongwen and Xuanwu were independent administrative districts before 2010, and they were merged into Dongcheng and Xicheng, respectively in 2010. In Figure 3 , we still treat them as independent districts because our sample period is mostly before 2010. Thus, samples distribute amongst 13 districts in Figure 3 .
most of the variables and in some cases even higher than the mean, thereby indicating the high heterogeneity amongst the development projects and developers.
(Insert Table 1 Here)
Model Specification
Following the theoretical framework, we describe developers' asking price for residential real estate development project i (0 1 ) as a linear function of an indicator of loss (LMNN 1 ), the observable attributes (6 1 ), the indicator of the year when house sales take place (O&G% 1 ), a constant (3 4 ) and the error term (P 12 ). This specification is given in Equation (4) . The definition of LMNN 1 can be found in Equation (5) 
In this specification, if 3 = is substantially greater than zero, then prior losses are associated with high asking prices that developers set in the later stage of home sales.
Real estate development is a long and complex process, during which developers generally make constant adjustments to their strategies. This condition is particularly true during the sales 
To investigate the overall effect of loss aversion, we augment Equation (4) to include sales in the whole project sales period, as shown in Equation (7). 0 1,V is the average sales price. In our sample, the maximum length of sales period is eight years (i.e. developers spent up to eight years to sell all units in their projects). We create eight dummy variables (i.e. W X , where j = 1, 2, 3, … 8) to indicate the different years when sales occurred during the sales period. Note that the dummy variable for the first year of sales period is omitted from Equation (7) because the effect has already been captured by 8 2= . We then create interaction terms between LMNN 1 and W X to capture the effect of loss aversion, if any, in each year of the sales period. W X is also included in Equation (7) to control for any other project-year specific effects other than loss aversion. 0 1,V is the average asking price of all saleable housing units in project i in the nth year of investigation. If a project took N years to sell out all of its units, then a total of N observations will be created for this project, one for each of the year within the sales period. 
The overall or accumulative effect of loss aversion for the whole sales period can be constructed with the coefficient estimates of LMNN 1 and its interaction terms in Equation (7). If it took three years for a project to sell all the completed units, then the accumulative loss aversion effect in year one, two, and three can be calculated as 3 = , 3 = + 3 > , and 3 = + 3 > + 3 [ respectively.
Reference Point Determination
Identifying reference point is crucial for the estimation of Equations (6) Lastly, we convert the 2003 weighted average price to the year when land lot i was purchased, with % \]^_ j . In sum, the formula to calculate the reference point is as Equation (8).
Results and Discussions
After matching each land transaction with transactions within 5-miles radius, we drop six land lots that have no comparable transaction. For the remaining 192 land lots, 12 comparable transactions emerge for each lot on average. We identify 82 land transactions in the loss domain and 110 in the gain domain. (Insert Table 2 Here) Table 3 presents the Ordinary Lease Square (OLS) estimates of Equation (6) . The coefficient estimates of control variables and year fixed effects are significant with expected signs. For simplicity, we present coefficient estimates of key variables only in Table 3 . In column (1), we present results by using all sample points. LOSS has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient confirms that developers compare land transaction with the reference price, and previous losses from land purchases affect their pricing decisions for houses that are completed later on these land lots. Specifically, developers in the loss domain set asking prices for newly completed houses 10% higher than their counterparts in the gain domain.
(Insert Table 3 Here)
Ownership
Existing evidence infers that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises (PEs) behave differently, especially in their decisions directly associated with economic profits. Under state controls, SOEs sometimes forgo maximum economic profit in the pursuit of social and political benefits. For instance, SOEs usually have excessive labor inputs [37] , and they are pressured to hire politically connected people, rather than those best qualified [38] .
Thus, SOEs are less efficient and profit driven than PEs [39] . SOEs typically have soft budget constraints and consequently less pressure from losing money [40; 41; 42] . Even in financial distress, they can always rely on the state to bail them out. Thus, they are not sensitive to financial losses. However, PEs do not have the backing from the state, and have to take responsibility for the bad decisions they made and the resultant losses. They should be responsive to prior losses. SOEs also have better access to external financing and lower cost of credit than PEs. They enjoy direct budgetary support from the government and preferential treatment by government-owned financial institutions [43] . Given the low cost of credit, a painful loss to PEs may not be as painful to SOEs. Consequently, state-owned developers may be less motivated to set high house prices and pursue breakeven. The manner in which firm ownership structure moderates loss aversion effect must be tested.
A Chow Structural Break test on Equation (6) confirms that the coefficient estimates for SOEs and PEs are not identical. Consequently, we estimate Equation (6) using SOEs and PEs subsamples separately. The results are given in columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 . We find that PEs are sensitive to losses. They set 12% higher asking prices when in the loss domain. However, no evidence of SOEs responds to land transaction losses. The results are in line with the existing literature as discussed previously. We conclude that the loss aversion premium estimated in the previous step, i.e. the 10% price increase estimated by using the full sample, is largely driven by the private sector.
Listing Status
The extensive literature on initial public offering documents the benefits of stock listing. These studies indicate that listed firms enjoy better access to financial resources [44] , lower cost of credit [44] and enhanced financial flexibility [43; 45] than unlisted firms. Therefore, we expect that firms that are listed on a stock exchange are less sensitive to losses than unlisted firms.
Using the same strategy as outlined in Section 5.1, we test if listed and unlisted firms have different responses to prior losses. Again, a Chow Structural Break test confirms that the two types of firms behaved differently. We subsequently estimate Equation (6) for listed firms and unlisted firms respectively. The results are given in columns (4) and (5) in Table 3 . Unlisted developers are more sensitive to losses than unlisted developers. They set asking 16% higher prices when they are in the loss domain. Listed developers, however, do not exhibit substantial loss aversion behaviour. Thus, the financial advantages provide listed companies with improved financial flexibility, and consequently cushions from temporary losses. The correlation between listed status and ownership structure in our sample is not high. For example, the correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.445; the proportion of listed companies is 77%, 33%, and 52% for SOEs, Pes, and all companies combined, respectively.
Therefore, the identified listing status effect is a separated issue from the ownership structure effect.
Overall Effect of Loss Aversion
In the previous section, we document that prior losses affect developer's pricing strategy when the property enters the market. In this section, we further probe if this effect persists throughout the whole selling period with model specified in Equation (7). We create one observation for each year of the project period, instead of only one observation in the first year of the project period in Equation (6) . The total number of observations in this step tripled from 195 to 742 because the average sales period is 2.89 years. Given that observations from the same project are related, we use clustered standard errors to correct any potential biases in the estimation.
Similar to the estimation of Equation (6), we have controlled for project, year and sales period duration fixed effects. Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates of Equation (7). We construct the accumulative effect of loss aversion over the entire project period based on Table 4 , and plot the results in Figure   4 . SOEs are not included in Figure 4 because the coefficient estimates of LMNN 1 are insignificant across the board. The figure reveals a nonlinear relationship between the length of sales period and the effect of loss aversion on asking prices of newly completed apartments.
If a project can sell out of its inventory within the first year, then the effect of loss aversion is estimated to be 14% of overpricing. Hence, developers' asking price is 14% higher than the fair market price. If it takes more than one year to clear the housing unit inventory, developers become rational in pricing the apartments in later stages of the sales. This change is evident from the downward slope of all curves from Year 1 to Year 3 in Figure 4 . However, if it takes more than three years to sell out the units, developers will become loss averse over the time.
This result is not surprising given the average length of sales period in our sample is 2.89 years.
When a project takes longer than usual (i.e. 2.89 years or 3 years) to sell out, developers become anxious about recovering land transaction loss. This result is also consistent with the findings in the studies of disposition effect, which is caused by loss aversion. Hence, the ones who are most prone to loss aversion effect are the least likely to sell at a loss, and thus likely to have the longest sales period. Therefore, loss aversion effect is the largest for projects with the longest sales period (i.e. 8 years in our sample).
(Insert Table 4 Here) (Insert Figure 4 Here)
Alternative Reference Point Determinations
In their influential paper, Kahneman and Tversky [9] provided a few candidates for reference point, such as the status quo, the expectations of decision makers and the formulation of offered prospects. However, empirical difficulties arise when applying their theory. Specifically, reference points are often formed under the influence of heuristics and biases; they are unobservable, heterogeneous and possibly nonstationary [46] . As such, the determination of reference points an empirical issue, and no hard and fast rule exists. On the one hand, this situation encourages and enables researchers to identify a wide range of reference points. On the other hand, it requires most behavioural studies to establish the robustness of their findings to different choices of reference points. In this section, we present results using an alternative definition of reference point in the estimation of Equations (6) and (7) to verify the robustness of our findings.
We consider a rational version of reference point, i.e. land price valuation based on hedonic price modelling. Real estate developers are professionals who know their markets and products well. Their knowledge and experience will help them form the reference point based on their implicit estimation of the land prices, especially when land lots are in areas with less frequent transactions. We adopt hedonic pricing technique to capture this implicit valuation process based on land hedonic characteristics. This technique has been widely used in the studies of land prices 11 .
We develop the valuation-based reference point by adopting a semi-log model specification as proposed by Mills (1971), Kau and Sirmans [47] and summarised by Colwell and Munneke [48] . The model specification is shown in Equation (9).
where Ln L 1 is the natural logarithm of land price per square meter for land parcel E; y 1 is a k×1
vector of explanatory variables including locational attributes, physical attributes, land use and developer characteristics; | 1 is a set of binary dummy variables which equals 1 only in the year of land transaction; z { and z } are coefficients to be estimated; P 1 is identically and independently distributed errors.
The choice of independent variables and the estimates of Equation (9) can be found in Appendix 1. We then use the predicted land value as developer's reference point, i.e. L~= %&' 1 , and calculate the indictor of losses in Equation (3) accordingly. Table 5 are still less loss averse than their counterparts. Therefore, our conclusion still holds that PEs and unlisted firms are more sensitive to losses than SOEs and listed firms.
The overall effect of loss aversion also exhibits nonlinear relationship with the year in the sales period, as demonstrated in Figure 4 . We did not report the estimated overall loss aversion effects for years 6 to 8 because observation numbers are insufficient (i.e. less than 20 data points) to obtain reliable estimations. This condition is an inherent shortcoming for the hedonic price modelling approach, which is more data intensive than the weighted average comparable prices approach used in Section 5. Figure 4 suggests that the overall loss aversion effect 11 It was developed from theory of consumer behaviour, which suggests that commodities are valued for their individual utility-bearing attributes or characteristics [47] . Various studies have explored this model in terms of attribute selection [48; 49] , functional form specification [50] and possible biases involved in the valuation method [51] . For recent applications in land valuation literature, see for example, Wang [52] , Sirmans and Slade [53] , and Nichols et al. [54] .
decreases from year 1 to year 3, and gradually bounces up since the fourth year. The pattern is very similar to that in Figure 3 . Overall, our conclusions remain the same when the alternative definition of reference point is used.
(Insert Table 5 Here) (Insert Figure 5 Here)
Conclusions
Using land transaction and apartment sales data in Beijing, this paper shows that prior losses Results also have implications for our understanding of the Chinese real estate markets.
Whether high land prices are to blame for the overheating in housing market in China or not is a hot topic for debate [51; 52] . Although our paper does not answer this question directly, the findings deduce that land overpricing is likely to spillover to housing market. As developers are reluctant to write off losses from overbidding in land auctions, overpricing mistakes in land market will not be corrected in the pricing decisions in the housing market. This condition will push up the price in housing market accordingly. If the central government of China wants to cool down the housing market-which is one of the strategic priories in the recent five-years plan of the nation-then it should look upstream, i.e. the land market, to find an effective solution. Our findings present yet another evidence that the land and housing markets in China are closely intervened, and should not be studied or regulated in isolation [53; 54] .
Appendix
We follow the land valuation literature to select the independent variables in Equation (9) . The first group is the locational attributes, including the distance to the city centre, distance to the nearest amenities, i.e. underground station, primary school, park and hospital. They normally affect house prices negatively. The second group comprises two binary variables indicating land use restrictions, i.e. commercial use and public use. All land parcels in our sample are restricted to residential development as the main land use purpose. However, some are allowed/required to have public use or commercial use too. Public and commercial land will, on the one hand, improve the convenience in the neighbourhood which has positive effect on future house prices. On the other hand, they also drive up construction costs. These considerations are taken into account by the developers when they purchase the land parcel.
We also include floor area rather than land area in the regression to represent lot size. In China, the maximum floor area ratio is always explicitly provided in any land-leasing contract and developers cannot construct over the floor area stated in the contract. Thus, floor area is more informative than land area in showing the potential of the land parcel.
As for developer characteristics, we use a dummy variable to indicate private ownership, as
SOEs normally have stronger financial capability and flexibility to offer high land prices.
Another important variable is a dummy variable for joint auction. When two or more developers purchase land parcels jointly, they have improved purchasing power so that they can bid high for favorable land parcels. Therefore, joint auction is a possible signal for high land price. values. However, given that this issue will not affect prediction, which is our main purpose of this analysis, we do not take further action to address this issue.
(Insert Table A 
